Cohen, Yishai. "Endless Future: A Persistent Thorn in the Kalam Cosmological Argument", Philosophical Papers 44:2 (2015), pp. 165-187.
A penultimate draft of the paper can be found here.
Also worthy of note is that the paper also provides a nice challenge to Koons' recent defense of the kalam argument based on a version of the Grim Reaper paradox.
P.S., his other papers in philosophy of religion are also well worth reading (e.g., his paper on the problem of the counterfactuals of divine freedom, and his paper on skeptical theism). Both can be found here.
Baras, Dan. "A Reliability Challenge to Theistic Platonism", Analysis (2017)doi: 10.1093/analys/anx089. Here's the abstract: Many philosophers believe that when a theory is committed to an apparently unexplainable massive correlation, that fact counts significantly against the theory. Philosophical theories that imply that we have knowledge of non-causal mind-independent facts are especially prone to this objection. Prominent examples of such theories are mathematical Platonism, robust normative realism and modal realism. It is sometimes thought that theists can easily respond to this sort of challenge and that theism therefore has an epistemic advantage over atheism. In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to widespread thought, some versions of theism only push the challenge one step further and thus are in no better position than atheism.
The penultimate draft can be found here.
In the 1960s, Eugene Wegner argued that the effectiveness of mathematics to explain and describe the natural world is a philosophical problem. Since then, a number of theists have appealed to Wegner's work as the basis for a theistic argument.
In a new paper ("The Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Physics of the Unknown", Synthese. (2017). doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1490-0), Alexei Grinbaum offers a reply to Wegner's original argument. The paper can be found here.
The interview covers theism's problem of creation ex nihilo and other topics. Those interested can listen here at Real Atheology.Relevant blog posts can be found here.
Many thanks to Justin Schieber and Ben Watkins for having me on RA! It's an excellent podcast. I highly recommend it to readers of this blog who are interested in valuable conversations about contemporary philosophy of religion.
In this post, I’d like to sketch a new (or at least under-explored) version of the problem of evil, which I will dub the problem of teleological evil. To begin, let’s call something an instance of teleological evil just in case it’s an instance of suffering that occurs in virtue of the natural purpose or design plan of a thing, i.e., it’s part of a thing’s design plan or one of its natural purposes to cause other beings to suffer. A given instance of teleological evil might ultimately trace back to one or more creaturely agents (e.g., a human or a devil), but unless it does, let's say that it falls under the more general category of natural evil. It’s important not to confuse the problem of teleological evil with the problem of dysteleology. The latter problem traces back to Darwin’s discussions of the imperfect design found in biological organisms and their parts. Commonly discussed examples include the panda’s thumb, the inverted retina, and the convolution of the sexual organs an…
Mooney, Justin. "Is the Problem of Evil a Deontological Problem?", Analysis (2017). (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx039).
Here's the abstract:
Recently, some authors have argued that experiences of poignant evils provide non-inferential support for crucial premisses in arguments from evil. Careful scrutiny of these experiences suggests that the impermissibility of permitting a horrendous evil might be characterized by a deontological insensitivity to consequences. This has significant implications for the project of theodicy.
We recently noted Pearce's new cosmological argument that applies recent work on the metaphysics of grounding and ontological dependence to the cosmological argument. Another new paper that aims to do the same is Soufiane Hamlie's "On the Ultimate Ground of Being", International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion (2017), 10.1007/s11153-017-9625-2. Here's the abstract: This paper presents a characterization of the ontological dependence relation between an existent and its sustaining cause, which allows to straightforwardly deduce that the being of any dependent existent is grounded on an independent one. Furthermore, an argument is given to the conclusion that there is a unique independent existent, which is therefore the ultimate ground of being.
And if a copy should find its way to my inbox, I wouldn't mind it in the least.
In "Foundational Grounding and the Argument from Contingency" (Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 8, forthcoming) Kenny Pearce exploits recent work on the metaphysics of grounding to develop an intriguing new version of the cosmological argument. The paper also won the 2016 Sanders Prize in philosophy of religion. Happy reading!
...with Philosophy Compass. The first article focuses on objections to Schellenberg's hiddenness argument. The second discusses new work that expands the scope of the discussion, including work on Maitzen's argument (on hiddenness and the demographics of theism), some new hiddenness-related problems, and also work that might provocatively be described as seeking to reclaim the hiddenness topic for theology. Also of note in the new issue are the papers on Pascal's Wager and on epistemic externalism in the philosophy of religion. Happy reading!
Colin Ruloff does excellent work in (among other areas) philosophy of religion. Some of his recent work concerns arguments surrounding theistic conceptualism. (See, for example, his "Divine Thoughts and Fregean Propositional Realism", International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76:1 (2014), pp. 41-51). His most recent paper on the topic is "On Propositional Platonism, Representation, and Divine Conceptualism", European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8:4 (2016), which addresses arguments from Gould and Davis against propositional platonism and for theistic conceptualism. Here is the abstract: Gould and Davis (2014) have recently argued for the claim that Propositional Platonism is mistaken since it is not able to explain how a proposition comes to bear its representational properties. But, say Gould and Davis, if Propositional Platonism is mistaken, then Divine Conceptualism must be true and we should therefore identify propositions with the contents of a di…
Recent work on the functional neurobiology of insects seems to suggest that insects may well be conscious, and some philosophers are starting to grapple with the potential ethical implications of this research. Dustin Crummett is one such philosopher. In his new paper, "The Problem of Evil and the Suffering of Creeping Things" (International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, forthcoming), Crummett explores the implications of insect suffering for the problem of evil. Here's the abstract:
Even philosophers of religion working on the problem of non-human animal suffering have ignored the suffering of creatures like insects. Sensible as this seems, it’s mistaken. I am not sure whether creatures like these can suffer, but it is plausible, on both commonsensical and scientific and philosophical grounds, that many of them can. If they do, their suffering makes the problem of evil much worse: their vast numbers mean the amount of evil in the world will almost certainly be …
Submission deadline: April 15, 2017
The Pantheism and Panentheism Project, funded by the John Templeton Foundation, welcomes applications for summer stipends from scholars and writers who wish to spend the summer writing a paper for publication in a peer-reviewed academic journal, a reputable magazine (if they wish to write for a popular audience), or an edited collection to be published by a leading academic publisher. We offer £1000 each to 10 applicants in the summer of 2017 and 9 awards of £1000 each in the summer of 2018. Co-authors are welcome to apply together but they will be awarded only one joint stipend of £1000.
Applicants are required to submit the following items electronically:
· A curriculum vitae
· An project abstract of no more than 200 words
· A project proposal of 1000-1500 words
Please email all of the above as a single PDF document by 15 April 2017 to firstname.lastname@example.org
The Pantheism and Panentheism Project fo…
Benton, Matthew. "Religious Diversity and Disagreement", In N. J. L. L. Pedersen, M. Fricker, P. Graham & D. Henderson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Social Epistemology. Routledge (forthcoming). Here's the abstract: Epistemologists have shown increased interest in the epistemic significance of disagreement, and in particular, in whether there is a rational requirement concerning belief revision in the face of peer disagreement. This article examines some of the general issues discussed by epistemologists, and then considers how they may or may not apply to the case of religious disagreement, both within religious traditions and between religious (and non-religious) views.